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Cash transfer programmes, like most social protection programmes, are vulnerable to fraud, errors, 
corruption and misuse of funds, which undermine their achievements1 (Perron, 2012: 1; Bhargava 
and Raha, 2015: vi). Effective mechanisms for transparency, accountability and participation help 
minimise those in need being wrongfully excluded from programme rolls; discourages clientelism 
and abuse of programmes for political and private gain by state actors; contributes to programme 
credibility; and enables programmes to more effectively serve their intended beneficiaries2 
(Gamba, 2016: 5; Bassett and Blanco, 2011: 1). Latin American countries developed two types of 
citizen oversight mechanisms for cash transfer programmes: individual3 and collective 
mechanisms, as a way of protecting the cash transfer programmes from corruption and vote-
catching behaviour (Eng and Perron, 2013: 8). Collective mechanisms bring together civil society, 
in particular beneficiaries, with public sector representatives to ‘monitor that there are no mistakes 
in terms of inclusion and exclusion of beneficiaries, guarantee that the programme functions 
according to its initial objectives, and monitor that the cash transfers are not captured by elites or 
political interests, nor affected by corruption or votecatching behaviour’ (Eng and Perron, 2013: 8). 
However, many cash transfer programme accountability mechanisms seem to favour individual 
approaches rather than collective action, which can result in individual beneficiaries being less 
able to combat abuses of power (Hevia de la Jara, 2008; Hevia, 2010; Jones and Shaheen, 2012).      
This five day rapid review looks at the experiences globally of civil society organisations providing 
or supporting accountability mechanisms in cash transfer programmes. Bhargava and Raha’s 
(2015: 12) review of civil society engagement with cash transfer programme accountability found 
only few studies, suggesting to them that there is a significant knowledge gap. A mixture of 
academic and grey literature was available.   
Civil society organisations have supported accountability in cash transfer programmes by: working 
to improve transparency to help citizens hold authorities accountable; vetting beneficiary lists for 
errors; encouraging compliance by highlighting benefits; gathering feedback to improve services; 
assessing programme vulnerability to integrity risks and advocating to improve matters; and 
gathering grassroots level information on the programmes.   
                                                 
1 Risks result from: lack of transparency in key systems (e.g. targeting, compliance verification); weakness in 
internal control and accountability systems; beneficiary falsification or concealment of information required for 
eligibility; bribes demanded from compliance verification officers to overlook non-compliance or validate 
compliance; unavailable or ineffective grievance redress processes; and interference with program design and 
implementation to derive political advantage (e.g. inappropriate inclusion or exclusion of eligible households) 
(Bhargava and Raha, 2015: vi). 
2 Assessments suggest that ‘the most important risk-mitigating improvements to conditional cash transfer 
programmes are the existence of clear criteria for beneficiary identification, registry, and eligibility (both for 
entering and exiting the program); the utilisation of well-designed Management Information Systems to carry out 
the main conditional cash transfer programmes processes (registration, eligibility, verification of co-
responsibilities, payments, complaints and appeals, and monitoring); and the existence of internal control 
mechanisms, which provide information to make necessary changes within programs’ (Bassett and Blanco, 2011: 
3). 
3 Allow individual citizens to make complaints or report irregularities (Eng and Perron, 2013: 8). Eng and Perron 
(2013: 8) find that such mechanisms are ‘highly dependent on the human and financial resources and mandates 
of the public agencies that are responsible for collecting and processing the complaints’.  
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Civil society organisations have supported or provided accountability mechanisms a number of 
different countries around the world. This report looks at case studies from Mexico; Brazil; 
Philippines; Mozambique; Occupied Palestine Territories; Peru; Kenya; Turkey; and Paraguay.  
Emerging lessons and good practice in relation to civil society organisations supporting or 
providing accountability mechanisms in cash transfer programmes include: 
▪ Civil society organisations’ support for, or provision of, accountability mechanisms for cash 
transfer programmes should not substitute for government accountability mechanisms, but 
complement them. A combination of top-down and bottom-up approaches is most 
effective in mitigating risks. 
▪ Civil society organisations can assess availability of information and advocate for 
greater transparency. Accessible Management Information Systems provide civil society 
organisations with the means to hold programmes accountable. 
▪ Civil society organisations can provide independent third party monitoring of cash 
transfer programmes and government oversight mechanisms. 
▪ Civil society organisations can be important facilitators in the implementation of cash 
transfer programmes by better linking authorities and beneficiaries. They can encourage 
targeted populations to participate at all stages of the programme design and 
implementation in order to prevent fraud and corruption. 
▪ Participation of civil society organisations in grievance reporting can improve its 
responsiveness by raising awareness and facilitating grievance filing and follow-up.  
▪ Well managed collaboration and coordination with all actors, including civil society 
organisations and beneficiaries, in cash transfer programmes decision-making processes 
is good practice. 
▪ Civil society organisations support for, or provision of, accountability mechanisms for cash 
transfer programmes should be operationally and financially independent of cash 
transfer programmes implementing agencies for greater effectiveness. 
▪ Developing good relationships with those responsible for the cash transfer 
programmes can help civil society organisations to encourage them to improve the quality 
of the programme. 
▪ Rights education by civil society organisations can empower beneficiaries to hold 
programme implementers to account.  
▪ Civil society organisations can use a methodology developed by Transparency 
International consisting of a risk assessment of the process of the cash transfer 
programme, a risk map of stakeholders, reporting, and monitoring and advocacy, to detect 
risks to integrity, possible exclusion errors, and a programme’s effective capacity.  
▪ Efforts should be made to strengthen and support local level civil society 
organisations’ oversight and control of accountability mechanisms. 
▪ Civil society organisations can provide technical advice to political parties on how to 
avoid and prevent political abuse of the programmes. 
▪ Civil society organisations are not necessarily representative of the beneficiaries who 
may lack time and other resources to get involved. Their effectiveness can be challenged 
by coordination challenges, funding constraints, limited scale, the political economy, and 
donor priorities. 
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▪ Lack of willingness by public officials to provide information, set up citizen oversight 
mechanisms, and correct and sanction corruption and mismanagement can pose problems 
for setting up civil society accountability mechanisms. This could be overcome by civil 
society organisations cooperating with audit institutions to perform social audits.  
2. Civil society and accountability mechanisms 
A review of citizen engagement and social accountability4  mechanisms in cash transfer 
programmes found a number of ways in which civil society organisations support accountability in 
cash transfer programmes (Bhargava and Raha, 2015: vii): 
▪ Assess awareness, access, and quality of information and provide feedback to authorities 
to further improve transparency, setting the basis for engaging citizens to hold the 
implementing authorities accountable. 
▪ Support communities to vet lists of beneficiaries to minimise obvious errors of inclusion, 
exclusion and exit.  
▪ Help to improve compliance with conditions by working with beneficiaries to help them 
understand benefits. 
▪ Help with beneficiary feedback collection and use it to constructively engage with service 
providers to improve access, quality, and responsiveness of the supply-side services (e.g. 
education, health) thereby enhancing impact. 
▪ Independently assess vulnerability of conditional cash transfer programmes to integrity 
risks5, performance of state run integrity risk management systems, and follow up with 
evidence-based constructive dialogue and advocacy to improve matters in vulnerable 
areas. 
▪ Gather information at the grassroots level on conditional cash transfer programmes 
outcomes (e.g. changed motivations, attitudes, and aspirations). 
Examples of social accountability tools used by civil society can be found in the Appendix at the 
end of this report.  
3. Country case studies 
Mexico 
In Mexico, the conditional cash transfer programme, the Programa de Desarrollo Humano 
Oportunidades (Programme for Human Development Opportunities) was founded in 1997 and first 
called PROGRESA (Hevia de la Jara, 2008: 65). The family was the target of the programme, 
bypassing existing civil society organisations such as peasants’ cooperatives, rural workers’ unions 
                                                 
4 According to the Global Partnership for Social Accountability (GPSA), social accountability mechanisms are 
programmes that feature citizen and civil society organisations engagement ‘with policymakers and service 
providers to bring about greater accountability for and responsiveness to citizens’ needs’ (in Bhargava and Raha, 
2015: 12).  
5 Integrity is the ‘capacity to prevent any deviations from its intended use and any change in the designated 
beneficiaries resulting from exclusion errors, clientelism, or abuse of power for personal gain’ (Bhargava and 
Raha, 2015: vi).  
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and community associations (Hevia de la Jara, 2008: 64). Hevia de la Jara (2008: 64) suggests 
that ‘the exclusion of community organisations and the strengthening of direct links with the 
beneficiaries aimed to prevent the reproduction of the old distortions of social policies in Mexico: 
corruption, authoritarian corporatism and political clientelism’. However, Hevia de la Jara (2008: 
64, 67-68) finds that the inadequate design of the mechanisms intended to empower the 
beneficiaries to oversee the programme, as well as the Mexican government’s inability to set 
mechanisms of direct communication with the millions of covered families, meant that local 
institutions were needed as intermediaries, which resulted in the continuation of authoritarian and 
clientelistic practices6.  
The institutional design of Oportunidades allowed for individual complaints and suggestions but 
discouraged collective action, which meant individual beneficiaries were less able to combat 
abuses of power (Hevia de la Jara, 2008: 68-69). Hevia de la Jara (2008: 64-65) suggests that civil 
society organisations did little to challenge these practices or oversee the programme as a result 
of engaging in the same practices themselves or being involved in the programme’s management. 
In addition civic associations ‘did not push or fight either for public overseeing or for stopping 
abuses of power at either the federal or the local level’ (Hevia de la Jara, 2008: 65). In 2005, the 
‘civic stream’ created a Programme of Incentive for Civil Society Organisations to provide 
information to these organisations, develop experiments of social supervision concerning the 
programme results and hold an annual meeting for accountability of the actions performed during 
the year (Hevia de la Jara, 2008: 68). However, Hevia de la Jara (2008: 68) reports that only a few 
organisations engaged with the programme.  
Beneficiaries themselves created Committees for Community Advancement/Community 
Promotion Committees to monitor the programme’s activities in more than 95,000 towns (Gamba, 
2016: 28). The committees ‘represent beneficiaries within the programme, pressure institutions to 
provide quality service to recipients, channel concerns and complaints and promote actions to 
strengthen social audits’ (Gamba, 2016: 28). They benefit from the country’s extensive and strong 
network of judicial and legal frameworks that regulates and oversees monitoring of the 
Oportunidades programme (Eng and Perron, 2013: 9). These are held up as an example of good 
practice by Transparency International’s review of cash transfer programmes in seven Latin 
American countries7 (Gamba, 2016: 28). However, beyond these committees and periodic 
feedback collection by the programme, Oportunidades is regarded as having very weak relations 
with civil society organisations, possibly as a result of the inadequate design of citizen participation 
and oversight mechanisms (Bhargava and Raha, 2015: 17).  
This experience suggests that ‘effective prevention, control and punishment of abuse of authority 
requires an institutional structure capable of embodying both direct and collective actions to 
oversee the programme’s performance’ (Hevia de la Jara, 2008: 65, 70). In addition, there need to 
                                                 
6 For example, those in charge of confirming the fulfilment of obligations controlled the amount of money that 
went to each family, which led to many programme’s beneficiaries being forced to carry out community work, 
such as sweeping the streets or healthcare posts, or to give part of the money they received to the authorities as 
a condition to keep receiving it (Hevia de la Jara, 2008: 68). They risked losing their benefits altogether if they 
challenge such practices as a result of the way in which the control of co-responsibilities worked (Hevia de la 
Jara, 2008: 68).  
7 Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Guatemala, Dominican Republic, Honduras and Peru. 
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be independent ‘collective actors enabled to and concerned with overseeing public policy’ if abuse 
of power is to be prevented (Hevia de la Jara, 2008: 65, 70-71).  
Brazil 
In Brazil, the conditional cash transfer programme, Bolsa Família, was started in 2003 (Sugiyama, 
2016: 1193). The accountability mechanisms used by the Bolsa Familia Programme include 
hotlines (toll-free call numbers), controls through the Public Audit Network, and Social Control 
Committees or councils (Bassett and Blanco, 2011: 10; Sugiyama, 2016: 1194, 1198).  
These social control units are enshrined in legislation and nearly 6,000 have been created since 
2005, operating in every municipality (National Secretary for Citizen Income, no date: 3; Bhargava 
and Raha, 2015: 17; Gamba, 2016: 28). Civil society, alongside members of the community and 
government, make up these committees or councils that are responsible for: verifying if the 
programme reaches the most vulnerable and poor; validating the accuracy of beneficiary data and 
the frequency of the recertification process; following the payment process; and ensuring 
monitoring of beneficiary compliance with co-responsibilities (Bassett and Blanco, 2011: 10; 
National Secretary for Citizen Income, no date). They report irregularities to the municipal 
government and, if these are not addressed in an appropriate and timely manner, to the Ministry 
of Social Development (which will follow up through the Public Audit Network) (Bassett and Blanco, 
2011: 10). They are also felt to be an example of good practice by Transparency International 
(Gamba, 2016: 28). However, Bhargava and Raha (2015: 17) suggest that in practice, social 
control committees and beneficiaries have only weak powers to represent themselves and their 
interests, with many observers agreeing that the process for selecting members is not transparent 
and social control of the cash transfer programme is largely ineffective.  
Like in Mexico the designers sought to prevent the programme from being used for clientelistic 
purposes by eliminating any type of social intermediation (through social organisations) and 
political intermediation (through the participation of political parties or other political actors) (Hevia, 
2010: 1). However, unintended consequences of this included that beneficiaries found it difficult to 
receive information, and to oversee and monitor the programme from the bottom, as well as 
engage in collective action to combat the power imbalances they faced (Hevia, 2010: 1). In 
addition, Hevia (2010: 1) argues the local civil society groups did not represent these beneficiaries, 
and as a result the social control committees were ‘decorative’ rather than participative.  
Sugiyama’s (2016: 1192) recent review of the programme found that ‘citizen- and community-
driven participatory mechanisms for ongoing monitoring and accountability are relatively weak’, 
although top down accountability processes, such as programmatic transparency and random 
audits, have ‘largely worked to protect the integrity of the programme’. There was ‘scant evidence 
that civil society organisations or Bolsa Família beneficiaries sought councils or committees as 
vehicles for social control of the programme’ and there appeared to be no civil society (or 
beneficiary) demand for it (Sugiyama, 2016: 1198, 1199). Sugiyama (2016: 1201) suggests the 
relatively low levels of community driven monitoring of the programme may be due to the ‘presence 
of a rather clean and well run social programme’. 
Sugiyama (2016: 1200) finds a positive example of how the provision of information and 
institutional channels for feedback encouraged programme monitoring by a community 
organisation that led to action by the government to make sure the grants were received by those 
who needed them. However, availability of this information is not sufficient if civil society 
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organisations are not prepared to use that information to monitor the programmes (Sugiyama, 
2016: 1200).  
Philippines 
In the Philippines, the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino conditional cash transfer (P4) programme 
started in 2007 (Bhargava and Raha, 2015: x). There are a variety of control and accountability 
mechanisms in place and the government has sought to collaborate with civil society to improve 
the integrity of the programme (Bhargava and Raha, 2015: 27-28). The cash transfer programme’s 
grievance redress mechanism involves civil society organisations’ involvement in 
advisory/grievance committees at the provincial and city/municipal levels (Patel et al, 2014: 4). 
Complaints about the programme can also be filed directly to independent NGO monitoring teams 
(Patel et al, 2014: 5). 
The Global Partnership for Social Accountability (GPSA) is supporting the Concerned Citizens of 
Abra for Good Government (CCAGG) with USD 800,000 between 2013 and 2018 to improve 
existing feedback mechanisms of the cash transfer programme to improve its targeting (GPSA, 
2016: 26). CCAGG engages with national and local government to trigger their responses (GPSA, 
2016: 27). Without CCAGG intervention in relation to noting exclusion errors, about 10 per cent of 
poor households in the project area would have been left behind (Bhargava and Raha, 2015: ix). 
In addition, there were ‘improvements in compliance with co-responsibilities and grievance 
resolution and enhanced public trust and support due to independent third-party monitoring’ 
(Bhargava and Raha, 2015: ix). 
The Department of Social Welfare and Development regards civil society organisations as its “third 
eye”, acting as watchdogs against corruption in projects and activities and facilitating action, 
feedback, and monitoring (Bhargava and Raha, 2015: 33-34). However, Bhargava and Raha 
(2015: 34, xii) find that there is scant evidence that civil society organisations perform this “third 
eye” role, with ‘very little evidence of citizen engagement and social accountability initiatives in the 
P4 Programme of the Philippines despite an impressive number of civil society organisations 
signing a pledge to do so’.  
Bhargava and Raha (2015: 34) suggest that civil society organisations could: validate beneficiary 
lists, report on targeting errors and assist with recertification; collect beneficiary feedback on 
access and quality of supply-side services in health or education programmes, along with 
advocating and assuming co-responsibility for overcoming supply bottlenecks; improve their 
involvement in the P4 programme by broadening awareness and sustaining public and political 
support for it; and help dispel the misconception that it is a dole-out rather than a development 
programme (Bhargava and Raha, 2015: xii). 
It is important when funding civil society organisations for social accountability initiatives to ensure 
the credibility of their participation, including safeguarding their independence while potentially 
criticising the government (Bhargava and Raha, 2015: xiii). Ways in which to overcome this 
challenge may include keeping the funding source for third-party monitoring entirely separate from 
the Department of Social Welfare and Development and putting in place rules to ensure that those 
engaged in the implementation process cannot also be selected for independent third party 
monitoring of the program (Bhargava and Raha, 2015: xiii). 
Bhargava and Raha (2015: 35-36) recommend improving and expanding civil society engagement 
to strengthen state-led integrity mechanisms in the cash transfer programme by disclosing more 
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information on the programme website; carrying out periodic beneficiary satisfaction and feedback 
surveys; monitoring and improving the functioning of Municipal Advisory Committees; and setting 
up incentives and funding for civil society organisations to engage in social accountability activities.  
Mozambique  
In Mozambique, the Basic Social Subsidy Programme (PSSB) has been in place since 1992. A 
new M&E system was being developed in 2013 in conjunction with a new management information 
system, supported by the launch of a pilot Civil Society Platform on Social Protection to promote 
community-based monitoring systems (Jones et al, 2013: 51; Selvester et al, 2012: 13). The aim 
is for these community-based monitoring systems to allow community members to work with the 
National Institute for Social Action, cash transfer programme beneficiaries, and other stakeholders, 
to improve the functioning of the cash transfer programme through creating a demand for greater 
accountability from beneficiaries (Selvester et al, 2012: 47).  
Occupied Palestine Territories 
Women’s organisations have been active in identifying people in need of support, sending them to 
the relevant ministry in the West Bank and encouraging them to exercise their rights in relation to 
the Palestinian National Cash Transfer Programme (PNCTP) (Jones et al, 2013: 47-48). NGOs 
have fostered a strong rights based culture, making programme beneficiaries aware that they are 
entitled to the cash transfer (Jones et al, 2013: 50). NGOs are involved in collecting citizen’s 
complaints about the programme and challenging them to the PNCTP Complaints Unit, which is 
responsible for responding to citizens’ grievances about the programme (Jones and Shaheen, 
2012: 39). However, complaints tend to be individual rather than group based and two reports on 
the West Bank and Gaza make little mention of civil society organisations supporting accountability 
in the cash transfer programme  (Jones and Shaheen, 2012: 66; Hamad and Pavanello, 2012, 53). 
There were also concerns that ‘the recently established community social protection committees 
(designed to channel community feedback into the targeting process) could be susceptible to 
clientelistic practices, especially as they tend to function as a collection of individuals who are 
consulted by MoSA on an ad hoc, individual basis, rather than as a group with a strong collective 
identity and sense of responsibility’ (Jones et al, 2013: 48).  
Peru 
The conditional cash transfer programme Juntos is monitored by the National Committee for 
Supervision and Transparency (Eng and Perron, 2008: 8). The Committee is autonomous and 
made up of representatives of the executive branch, the Church, regional and local governments, 
the private sector and the National Roundtable for the Fight Against Poverty8(Eng and Perron, 
2008: 8). There are also 638 local committees, although lack of proper preparation for communities 
has hampered their efforts (Eng and Perron, 2008: 8; Bhargava and Raha, 2015: 21). The 
committees identify implementation issues through surveys and complaints, and provide 
recommendations to the programme’s Executive Council (Eng and Perron, 2008: 9). Between 
2006 and 2009, nine recommendations for improvement were made, and in 2009, almost half of 
the complaints were resolved (Eng and Perron, 2008: 9).  
                                                 
8 Multi-sector government-civil society forum. 
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Kenya 
In Kenya, HelpAge International headed the Social Protection Rights Component of the Kenya 
Hunger Safety Net Programme which was responsible for informing the communities and 
beneficiaries of their rights and responsibilities and providing a transparent grievance mechanism 
(Fitzgibbon, 2014: 7). They planned to support local civil society organisations around rights 
education in order to empower community members to hold duty bearers accountable, and to serve 
as channels for complaints and other information about programme operations (Barrett, 2008: 
152).  
Beneficiary welfare committees (BWCs) are supposed to enable the community to input more into 
the Cash Transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable Children programme and since they have been put 
in place information flows about the programme regulations and entitlements seem to be smoother 
(Jones et al, 2013: 48).  
Turkey 
Turkey’s conditional cash transfer programme established provincial-level Boards of Trustees to 
provide independent oversight and deal with complaints and appeals, as well as a national unit 
which receives and classifies appeals for further handling (Barrett, 2008: 144). Members of the 
boards included locally elected representatives, provincial social service directors, NGOs and 
police (Barrett, 2008: 144).  
However, the boards have been criticised for being insufficiently connected with the grassroots 
and inaccessible to the most vulnerable (Barrett, 2008: 144). The beneficiaries of the programmes 
often lacked the resources to protect their rights and provide necessary feedback to policy makers 
(Barrett, 2008: 144). Greater focus was placed on the mechanics of appeal and complaint 
submission and resolution than on proactive beneficiary empowerment (Barrett, 2008: 145).  
Paraguay 
The GPSA is supporting Fundación Comunitaria Centro de Información y Recursos para el 
Desarrollo (CIRD) with USD 600,000 between 2014 and 2018 to strengthen the social 
accountability mechanisms of the Cash 
Conditional Transfer Programme (TEKOPORÃ) to improve its targeting and the quality of health 
and education services linked to the programme (GPSA, 2016: 28). CIRD is working with citizen-
led municipal roundtables and beneficiary families to gather and systemise feedback on the 
programme’s performance, including supply gaps in health and education, to share with the 
relevant government ministries to strengthen the targeting, transparency and performance of the 
programme (GPSA, 2016: 28).   
4. General lessons and best practice  
A review of control and accountability mechanisms in cash transfer programmes found a number 
of emerging good practices and lessons for greater engagement of citizens, civil society 
organisations, and the use of social accountability initiatives, including (Bhargava and Raha, 2015: 
vii-ix):  
10 
▪ Complementary to state mechanisms, not a substitute: Social accountability initiatives 
can be an effective complement to state mechanisms, but such accountability mechanisms 
engaging citizens/civil society organisations should not substitute existing internal 
management information systems of the cash transfer programmes already in use. A 
combination of top-down (e.g. supreme audit institutions, evaluation, spot checks) and 
bottom-up (e.g. beneficiary and civil society participation in key processes) approaches is 
most effective in mitigating risks (Bhargava and Raha, 2015: viii). A review of World Bank 
supported conditional cash transfer programmes in Latin America and the Caribbean also 
notes that social accountability mechanisms should be complementary to formal audits 
and internal monitoring, rather than a substitute for it (World Bank, 2007: 14). 
▪ Assessing availability of information and advocating for greater transparency: 
Quality and accessibility of information disclosed on conditional cash transfer programmes 
is important for social accountability initiatives. Civil society organisations should assess 
the availability of information and advocate for greater transparency (Bhargava and Raha, 
2015: viii). A seven country9 Latin American study also finds that civil society organisations 
can play an important role in the public dissemination of information to help citizens monitor 
the programme (Gamba, 2016: 27). A review of conditional cash transfer programmes in 
Latin America looking at accountability and information management practices found that 
management information systems can provide civil society organisations with the means 
to hold the programme accountable, provided they have timely access to those systems 
(Baldeon and Arribas-Baños, 2008: 36). 
▪ Independent third-party monitoring on the effectiveness of state-led integrity assurance 
systems by civil society organisations is essential to enhance the integrity of conditional 
cash transfer programmes. Government tends to establish the major mechanisms to 
oversee, monitor, and audit cash transfer programmes. Typically these are not sufficient 
and/or function poorly and need to be complemented by civil society organisations’ 
monitoring, both of the delivery of the conditional cash transfer programmes and the 
performance of governments’ own oversight mechanisms for conditional cash transfer 
programmes (Bhargava and Raha, 2015: viii). 
▪ Civil society organisations as facilitators: Civil society organisations and civil society 
volunteers can be important facilitators in implementation of the conditional cash transfer 
programmes by better linking authorities and beneficiaries. The effectiveness of civil 
society organisations can vary depending on the facilitators’ caseload, skills, and 
knowledge and can be undermined when authorities within the programmes have weak 
relations with civil society organisations, since both sides may be wary of collaborating with 
each other due to the time and skills required. Authorities need to take measures to ensure 
civil society organisations can genuinely participate in programme design, implementation, 
monitoring and evaluation (Bhargava and Raha, 2015: vii). A rapid literature review looking 
at corruption prevention strategies in cash transfer schemes suggests for example, that 
civil society can play an important role in encouraging the participation of targeted 
populations at all stages of the programme design and implementation in order to prevent 
fraud and corruption (Chêne, 2010: 8). The author uses the example of the Peruvian cash 
transfer programme, which has established a board with a balanced representation of 
involved ministries and local civil society organisations (Chêne, 2010: 8). 
                                                 
9 Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Guatemala, Dominican Republic, Honduras and Peru.  
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▪ Participating in grievance reporting: Civil society participation improves the 
responsiveness of grievance reporting and other beneficiary feedback mechanisms by 
raising awareness and facilitating grievance filing and follow-up (Bhargava and Raha, 
2015: viii). 
▪ Collaboration and coordination in programme decision making processes: 
Collaboration with beneficiaries and civil society organisations in conditional cash transfer 
programmes decision-making processes is good practice but has risks that need to be 
managed. Such collaboration can help beneficiaries access relevant programme 
information, comply with their responsibilities, monitor programme performance, provide 
feedback, and seek remedial actions against unjust practices. Experience suggests that 
collaborative decision making bodies can only be effective when the oversight of local 
government is limited, political interference is limited, and performance-monitoring 
indicators are used (Bhargava and Raha, 2015: vii-viii). A study looking at beneficiary and 
community perceptions of five unconditional cash transfer programmes in Gaza and the 
West Bank, Yemen, Kenya, Mozambique, and Uganda, found that there is a need for 
strengthened coordination across government agencies, NGOs and religious organisation 
service providers, facilitated by the national registry system, a mapping of complementary 
services and programmes, and strengthened management information systems, for 
improved programme governance and accountability (Jones et al, 2013: 59). 
▪ Independent of implementing agencies: Social accountability initiatives should be 
operationally and financially independent of cash transfer programmes implementing 
agencies for greater effectiveness. If civil society organisations are part of implementation 
(or, for example, paid by a government cash transfer programmes implementing agency) 
they are not in a position to hold the implementing agency accountable. Funding from 
external sources such as the GPSA gives civil society organisations operational and 
financial independence. Countries could adopt this good practice by considering 
collaborating between state oversight agencies and civil society organisations to carry out 
social accountability work that complements the work of oversight agencies. A good 
practice example is the growing practice of participatory audits sponsored by Supreme 
Audit Institutions (Bhargava and Raha, 2015: viii-ix). 
Forging relationships to improve the quality of cash transfer 
programmes  
The seven country Latin American study suggests that ‘the relationship that civil society 
organisations can forge with those responsible for the programmes, in order to develop efficient 
protocols and systems for handling citizen enquiries, presents a significant opportunity to improve 
the quality of [conditional cash transfer programmes] management in the region’ (Gamba, 2016: 
21).  
Rights education can empower beneficiaries 
A review of international experiences in the design and implementation of grievance mechanisms 
for cash transfer programmes carried out by HelpAge International suggests that ‘comprehensive 
rights education involving civil society organizations is a pre-requisite for achieving accountability’, 
as well as sufficient resourcing of accountability mechanisms to make them accessible at 
community level (Barrett, 2008: 145, 153). 
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Using tools to ensure that cash transfer programmes implement 
effective transparency and accountability mechanisms  
The report based on participatory assessments carried out in seven countries in Latin America, 
between 2008 and 2014, involving more than 14,000 beneficiaries, 700 public officials and many 
civil society organisations, found that ‘many [cash transfer] programmes have established social 
accountability mechanisms in at least some stages, in addition to adopting effective rules 
governing access to programme information’ (Gamba, 2016: 5). However, despite this many of the 
programmes were designed in ways which left them vulnerable to corrupt and clientelistic 
behaviour (Gamba, 2016: 5).  
In response, in 2008, Transparency International (2014: 16) began developing a methodology for 
civil society organisations to ensure that conditional cash transfer programmes implemented 
effective transparency and accountability mechanisms. The methodology focuses mainly on 
detecting risks to integrity (programme's capacity to prevent any deviations from intended use and 
any changes in the designated beneficiaries, whether these result from exclusion errors, 
clientelism or abuse of power for personal gain), possible exclusion errors, and a programme’s 
effective capacity (Gamba, 2016: 5; Transparency International, 2014: 16). The methodology has 
been tested in Argentina, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Bolivia, Guatemala, Peru and Honduras 
during 2012-2014 to develop concrete evidence-based measures to drive changes and 
improvements, which in turn could make cash transfer programmes more transparent and effective 
(Transparency International, 2014: 20). The methodology consists of a risk assessment of the 
process of the cash transfer programme; a risk map of stakeholders, reporting, and monitoring and 
advocacy (Transparency International, 2014: 32).  
Local level civil society led oversight and control 
It is suggested that, because the grievance and complaints procedures in cash transfer 
programmes in Latin America were found to be weak, it is important that there is civil society led 
oversight and control, especially at the local level (Gamba, 2016: 29). Their involvement in 
strengthening beneficiary engagement and complaints should involve fact checking of programme 
promises and citizen appeals against exclusion from programmes and technical support to all 
those interested in the control and oversight of the programmes (Gamba, 2016: 29). Grassroots 
organisations should strive to develop and ongoing dialogue with oversight bodies to apply positive 
pressure in relation to close monitoring of programme activities (Gamba, 2016: 29). The social 
audit functions of existing local and grassroots organisations should also be strengthened and 
supported, as these allow oversight and vertical control of the components and relationships most 
exposed to integrity risks (Gamba, 2016: 28). A review of World Bank supported conditional cash 
transfer programmes in Latin America and the Caribbean also notes that special emphasis is 
placed in many conditional cash transfer programmes on strengthening the capacities of 
community organisations and/or parents’ associations to participate in the monitoring or “social 
auditing” of programme operation (World Bank, 2007: 6). 
13 
Technical advice for political parties 
Civil society organisations can also provide technical advice to political parties to aid them to take 
steps to avoid and prevent political abuse of the programmes10 (Gamba, 2016: 31). Monitoring and 
assessment methodologies for tracking social programmes, in particular during election years, 
could help ensure constant monitoring by civil society organisations, to help prevent the 
programmes being used as a bargaining chip in vote-buying and coerced voting activities (Gamba, 
2016: 31). 
Civil society organisations face challenges to be effective and 
representative   
Jones et al (2016: 1209) warn that excluded groups may not get involved with civil society 
organisations due to a lack of time and other resources, while civil society itself is sometimes 
plagued by clientelism and rent-seeking. In addition, civil society may face challenges related to 
coordination, funding, scale, the political economy, and donor priorities (Jones et al, 2016: 1215).  
Lack of political will 
Participants in an online module on citizen oversight of public policies suggest that challenges to 
creating citizen oversight committees included reluctance by public officials to disclose information; 
create citizen oversight mechanisms; and correct and sanction corruption and mismanagement 
(Oropeza, 2014: 6). They suggested that in this case civil society organisations could form 
partnerships with Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs)11 to perform social audits, which could involve 
things like crossing-check their institutional databases to verify data on beneficiary lists and budget 
allocation, for example (Oropeza, 2014: 6). A good example of this is suggested to be in Mexico, 
where Fundar, together with the Mexican SAI, monitored beneficiaries of the Farm Subsidies 
Programme to reveal inconsistencies in the targeting process (Oropeza, 2014: 6). 
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Appendix: Overview of citizen engagement and social 
accountability tools12 
Tool Definition/uses 
Budget Literacy Campaign Budget Literacy Campaigns are efforts—usually by civil 
society, academics, or research institutes—to build citizen 
and civil society capacity to understand budgets in order to 
hold government accountable for budget commitments and 
to influence budget priorities. 
Citizen Charter Citizen Charter is a document that informs citizens about the 
service entitlements they have as users of a public service, 
the standards they can expect for a service (timeframe and 
quality), remedies available for non-adherence to the 
standards, and the procedures, costs, and charges of a 
service. The charters entitle users to an explanation (and in 
some cases compensation) if the standards are not met. 
Citizen Report Card Citizen Report Card is an assessment of public services by 
the users (citizens) through client feedback surveys. It goes 
beyond data collection to being an instrument for exacting 
public accountability through extensive media coverage and 
civil society advocacy that accompanies the process. 
Citizen Satisfaction Surveys Citizen satisfaction surveys provide a quantitative 
assessment of government performance and service delivery 
based on citizens' experience. Depending on the objective, 
the surveys can collect data on a variety of topics ranging 
from perceptions of performance of service delivery and 
elected officials to desires for new capital projects and 
services. 
Citizen/User Membership Citizen/User Membership in decision-making bodies is a way 
to ensure accountability by allowing people who can reflect 
users’ interests to sit on committees that make decisions 
about project activities under implementation (project-level 
arrangement) or utility boards (sector-level arrangement). 
Citizens’ Juries Citizens’ Juries are a group of selected members of a 
community that make recommendations or actions 
participatory instruments to supplement conventional 
democratic processes. 
Community Contracting Community Contracting is when community groups are 
contracted for the provision of services, or when community 
groups contract service providers or the construction of 
infrastructure. 
                                                 
12 Taken from Bhargava and Raha, 2015: 39-41.  
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Community Management Community Management is when services are fully managed 
or owned by service users or communities. Consumers own 
the service directly (each customer owns a share) when they 
form cooperatives. 
Community Monitoring Community Monitoring is a system of measuring, recording, 
collecting, and analyzing information, and communicating 
and acting on that information to improve performance. It 
holds government institutions accountable, provides ongoing 
feedback, shares control over M&E, engages in identifying 
and/or taking corrective actions, and seeks to facilitate 
dialogue between citizens and project authorities. 
Community Oversight Community Oversight is the monitoring of publicly funded 
construction projects by citizens, community-based and/or 
civil society organizations participating directly or indirectly in 
exacting accountability. It applies across all stages of the 
project cycle, although the focus is on the construction 
phase. 
Community Scorecard A Community Scorecard is a community-based monitoring 
tool that assesses services, projects, and government 
performance by analyzing qualitative data obtained through 
focus group discussions with the community. It usually 
includes interface meetings between service providers and 
users to formulate an action plan to address any identified 
problems and shortcomings. 
Focus Group Discussions Focus Group Discussions are usually organized with specific 
goals, structures, time frames, and procedures in mind. 
Focus groups are composed of a small number of 
stakeholders to discuss project impacts and concerns and 
consult in an informal setting. They are designed to gauge 
the response to the project's proposed actions and to gain a 




Grievance Redress Mechanism (or complaints-handling 
mechanism) is a system by which queries or clarifications 
about the project are responded to, problems with 
implementation are resolved, and complaints and grievances 
are addressed efficiently and effectively. 
Independent Budget Analysis Independent Budget Analysis is a process where civil society 
stakeholders research, explain, monitor, and disseminate 
information about public expenditures and investments to 
influence the allocation of public funds through the budget. 
Input Tracking Input Tracking refers to monitoring the flow of physical 
assets and service inputs from central to local levels. It is 
also called input monitoring. 
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Integrity Pact An Integrity Pact is a transparency tool that allows 
participants and public officials to agree on rules to be 
applied to a specific procurement. It includes an “honesty 
pledge” by which involved parties promise not to offer or 
demand bribes. Bidders agree not to collude in order to 
obtain the contract; and if they do obtain the contract, they 
must avoid abusive practices while executing it. 
Participatory Budgeting Participatory Budgeting is a process through which citizens 
participate directly in budget formulation, decision making, 
and monitoring of budget execution. It creates a channel for 
citizens to give voice to their budget priorities. 
Participatory Physical Audit Participatory Physical Audit refers to community members 
taking part in the physical inspection of project sites, 
especially when there are not enough professional auditors 
to inspect all facilities. Citizens measure the quantity and 
quality of construction materials, infrastructure, and facilities. 
Participatory Planning Participatory Planning convenes a broad base of key 
stakeholders, on an iterative basis, in order to generate a 
diagnosis of the existing situation and develop appropriate 
strategies to solve jointly identified problems. Project 
components, objectives, and strategies are designed in 
collaboration with stakeholders. 
Procurement Monitoring Procurement Monitoring refers to independent, third-party 
monitoring of procurement activities by citizens, 
communities, or civil society organizations to ensure there 
are no leakages or violation of procurement rules. 
Public Displays of Information Public Displays of Information refers to the posting of 
government information, usually about projects or services, 
in public areas, such as on billboards or in government 
offices, schools, health centers, community centers, project 
sites, and other places where communities receive services 
or discuss government affairs. 
Public Expenditure Tracking 
Surveys 
Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys involves citizen groups 
tracing the flow of public resources for the provision of public 
goods or services from origin to destination. It can help to 
detect bottlenecks, inefficiencies, or corruption. 
Public Hearings Public Hearings are formal community-level meetings where 
local officials and citizens have the opportunity to exchange 
information and opinions on community affairs. Public 
hearings are often one element in a social audit initiative. 
Public Reporting of 
Expenditures 
Public Reporting of Expenditures refers to the public 
disclosure and dissemination of information about 
government expenditures to enable citizens to hold 
government accountable for its expenditures. 
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Social Audit Social Audit (also called Social Accounting) is a monitoring 
process through which organizational or project information 
is collected, analyzed, and shared publicly in a participatory 
fashion. Community members conduct investigative work at 
the end of which findings are shared and discussed publicly. 
User Management 
Committees 
User Management Committees refer to consumer groups 
taking on long-term management roles to initiate, implement, 
operate, and maintain services. User management 
committees are for increasing participation as much as they 
are for accountability and financial controls. 
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